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MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE: A TORT IN 
TENSION 
Ellen Rock1* 
The rationale for the tort of misfeasance in public office remains the subject of 
academic speculation. This article adopts the concept of accountability as the 
tort’s guiding rationale, analysing it within the accountability framework: who is 
accountable to whom, for what, and how? Within this framework, it is possible 
to identify various points of tension between aspects of the tort, as it pulls at 
different times towards the disparate goals of restoration, desert, and deter-
rence. Characterising the tort as an accountability mechanism allows us to 
view it as reflecting a compromise between these accountability goals, and 
also helps explain why the tort continues to draw interest in public and private 
law circles, notwithstanding its low rate of success in practice. 
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Introduction 
The tort of misfeasance in public office occupies an uncomfortable 
position in the private law sphere. Tortious in form, it is a cause of ac-
tion commenced by individuals for the purpose of repairing harm oc-
casioned by a breach of obligations. Moves to reclassify it as a ‘public 
law tort’2 reflect some of its more anomalous features — most notably, 
the significant hurdles imposed by the high-grade mental elements 
that restrict liability to knowing or subjectively reckless behaviour; the 
narrow meaning of ‘public office’; and the application of principles of 
vicarious liability. This article explores the concept of accountability as 
a possible rationale for the misfeasance tort and asks whether adopt-
ing this view might assist in explaining some of its more anomalous 
aspects. Accountability theorists analyse mechanisms within the 
framework of who is accountable to whom, for what, and how? This 
article adopts that accountability framework to examine the shape of 
the misfeasance tort. Having done so, it is possible to identify a num-
ber of points of tension in the tort, where it pulls towards different 
goals of accountability: restoration, desert and deterrence. This article 
concludes that, when conceptualised as an accountability mechanism, 
the misfeasance tort reflects a compromise between these various 
rationales for accountability. So, for instance, we can view the high-
grade mental element of malice as accommodating the desert ra-
tionale (in preference to the restoration rationale), and the requirement 
of proof of damage as accommodating the restoration rationale (in 
preference to the desert rationale). Ultimately, thinking of the tort of 
misfeasance in public office as an accountability mechanism may as-
sist in explaining why the tort remains a focus of fascination for public 
and private lawyers alike, notwithstanding that public officials are only 
rarely held accountable for the wrong that it reflects. 
                                                     
 2 Mark Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: Some Unfinished Business’ (2016) 
132 (July) Law Quarterly Review 427, 428 (‘Unfinished Business’); Donal Nolan, ‘A 
Public Law Tort: Understanding Misfeasance in Public Office’ in Kit Barker et al 
(eds), Private Law and Power (Hart Publishing, 2017) 177; Donal Nolan, ‘Tort and 
Public Law: Overlapping Categories?’ (2019) 135 (April) Law Quarterly Review 272 
(‘Tort and Public Law’). 
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I  Defining Accountability 
The literature on accountability is replete with competing definitions.3 
While almost universally regarded as a desired feature of modern 
democratic regimes,4 the precise content of the concept remains elu-
sive.5 One of the more widely accepted definitions is that offered by 
Bovens, who defines accountability as ‘a relationship between an ac-
tor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences’.6 While many theo-
rists dispute the content of the concept of accountability, most agree 
that accountability mechanisms can be mapped out by reference to 
the answers to a series of questions: who is accountable to whom, for 
what, and how?7 When asking who is held accountable, authors are 
                                                     
 3 See generally Ellen Rock, ‘Accountability: A Core Public Law Value?’ (2017) 24(3) 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 189, 192–3 nn 14–38 (‘A Core Public Law 
Value?’). 
 
 4 Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ 
(2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447, 448–9 (‘Analysing and Assessing Ac-
countability’). It is described as a ‘golden [concept] that no one can be against’: at 
448. 
 
 5 Sinclair describes the study of accountability as the exploration of ‘a “bottomless 
swamp”, where the more definitive we attempt to render the concept, the more 
murky it becomes’: Amanda Sinclair, ‘The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and 
Discourses’ (1995) 20(2–3) Accounting, Organizations and Society 219, 221. Sin-
clair borrows this phrasing from Robert A Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’ (1957) 2(3) 
Behavioral Science 201, 201. 
 
 6 Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 450. See also Mark Bovens, 
‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism’ 
(2010) 33(5) West European Politics 946, 951; Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans 
and Paul ’t Hart, ‘Does Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool’ (2008) 
86(1) Public Administration 225, 225. 
 
 7 See, eg, Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 454–5; Richard 
Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 22–3; Jerry L Mashaw, ‘Accountability and Institutional 
Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance’ in Michael W Dowdle 
(ed), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 115, 118; Mark Philp, ‘Delimiting Democratic Accountability’ 
(2009) 57(1) Political Studies 28, 42; Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory 
State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38, 41; Ruth W Grant and Robert O 
Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 99(1) 
American Political Science Review 29, 34. 
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seeking to identify the party that will play the role of account-giver in a 
particular situation.8 The answer might be relatively straightforward in 
cases where one person is solely and directly responsible for exercis-
ing a particular power and producing a particular result (individual ac-
countability). However, the answer to this question will be more com-
plex in cases where multiple parties have contributed to an impugned 
outcome, or where the responsibility for performance rests on some-
one other than the person who has in fact exercised the power. In 
such cases, it may be appropriate to designate a group entity as the 
relevant account-giver (corporate accountability),9 or to hold a superi-
or accountable for the conduct of inferiors (hierarchical accountabil-
ity).10 The analysis will be further complicated in circumstances where 
there are multiple contributors who have no direct relationship with 
one another — for example, where two separate entities each made 
decisions that were partly responsible for the impugned result.11 In the 
context of public law accountability, one important subsidiary question 
is whether private contractors should fall within the class of govern-
ment officials who should be held accountable for the exercise of pub-
lic power.12 
When asking to whom an account is rendered, there is a diver-
gence in the literature. Some authors focus on the identification of the 
forum in which accountability is to be adjudicated, such as the 
courts.13 Other authors are more concerned with identifying the party 
who is entitled to bring the actor before that forum. The entitlement to 
hold someone accountable may arise on the basis that a person who 
                                                                                                                  
 
 8 See, eg, Mulgan (n 7) 23; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 
454. 
 
 9 Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 458. Bovens also identifies 
‘collective’ accountability as a dynamic in which various actors are jointly accounta-
ble for the result: at 458–9. 
 
 10 Ibid 458. 
 
 11 Mulgan (n 7) 23. 
 
 12 See, eg, Scott (n 7) 41; Mashaw (n 7) 151–2. 
 
 13 See, eg, Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 455–7. 
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authorised the exercise of power in the first place is entitled to super-
vise its performance (delegation model).14 Alternatively, a person who 
is affected by the exercise of power may be seen as entitled to hold 
the person who exercised it accountable.15 In the case of this latter 
premise, there may be a need to distinguish between those who are 
affected by the exercise of power, so as to afford them a formal right 
to demand an account, and those stakeholders who are merely inter-
ested in the outcome.16 
The question of about what an account is rendered is necessarily 
context-specific, to the extent that it involves analysis of an actor’s 
compliance with standards of conduct. At a general level, it is possible 
to think about the sources of such standards (for example, legal in-
struments, economic imperatives, and social or democratic obliga-
tions),17 or the nature of the conduct that might be the subject of those 
standards (for example, contravention of rules relating to procedure, 
performance, fairness, continuity, and security).18 
The question of how accountability is enforced is focused on the 
procedure pursuant to which an actor is held accountable. For some 
authors, this question is already answered in part by the second ques-
tion — to whom an account should be rendered — as they focus on 
the relevant forum in which accountability is adjudicated.19 For others, 
this question involves a more in-depth analysis, not only of the ac-
countability forum, but also of the process, procedure, and outcome of 
the enquiry.20 For example, Mulgan sees the accountability process as 
                                                     
 14 Grant and Keohane (n 7) 31. 
 
 15 Ibid. 
 
 16 Mulgan (n 7) 24–5. 
 
 17 Ibid 28. 
 
 18 See Scott (n 7) 42; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 459–60; 
Robert D Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Brookings Institution Press, 
2001) 6–10. 
 
 19 See, eg, Mulgan (n 7) 24–8; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’ (n 4) 
455–7. 
 
 20 See, eg, Mashaw (n 7) 118. Mashaw addresses the how question by asking 
‘through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards the pu-
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involving the three stages of ‘information’ (being ‘initial reporting and 
investigating’), ‘discussion’ (being ‘justification and critical debate’), 
and ‘rectification’ (being ‘the imposition of remedies and sanctions’).21 
Other authors do not adopt a prescriptive approach to the question of 
how accountability is to be enforced, preferring the view that the rele-
vant procedure should be the one best suited to serving the purposes 
of accountability.22 
Beyond this mechanical framework for analysis of accountability 
mechanisms, however, the literature again diverges in specifying the 
purpose of (or rationale for) accountability. There are a number of po-
tential rationales evident in the literature. Perhaps the broadest over-
arching rationale for accountability is to support the legitimacy of gov-
ernment.23 On this view, we are more likely to regard our system of 
government as legitimate if we regard it as accountable, and less like-
ly to regard it as legitimate if accountability mechanisms are lacking.24 
But this broad objective does not take us very far in thinking about 
what we expect of accountability mechanisms in concrete terms. For 
that answer, we need to look at the more tangible rationales of trans-
parency, control, restoration, desert, and deterrence.25 According to 
                                                                                                                  
tatively accountable behaviour is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of 
finding that those standards have been breached’ (emphasis in original). 
 
 21 Mulgan (n 7) 30. 
 
 22 See, eg, Philp (n 7) 42. 
 
 23 Frederick M Barnard, Democratic Legitimacy: Plural Values and Political Power 
(McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) xi; Bovens, Schillemans and ’t Hart (n 6) 
239; Mark Bovens, Deirdre Curtin and Paul ’t Hart, ‘Studying the Real World of EU 
Accountability: Framework and Design’ in Mark Bovens, Deirdre Curtin and Paul ’t 
Hart (eds), The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit? (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 31, 53. 
 
 24 See, eg, Bovens, Schillemans and ’t Hart (n 6) 239. 
 
 25 For further detail, see Rock, ‘A Core Public Law Value?’ (n 3) 189, 194–6; Ellen 
Rock, ‘Fault and Accountability in Public Law’ in Mark Elliott, Jason NE Varuhas and 
Shona Wilson Stark (eds), The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2018) 171, 173–4. I have previously re-
ferred to the desert and deterrence rationales jointly as the ‘punitive’ objective of 
accountability. For present purposes, it is important to draw out these two ideas as 
separate rationales. 
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the transparency rationale, the core focus of accountability is to pro-
vide the public with a means of scrutinising government decision-
making and operations. The control rationale is concerned with provid-
ing those who have delegated power with a means to dictate the 
terms on which it is exercised, and to bring that exercise back within 
legal boundaries. Restoration is concerned with righting wrongs by 
providing a means of redress where an excess of power has caused 
loss or harm. The desert rationale is concerned with condemning the 
abuse of power. Finally, the deterrence rationale is concerned with 
discouraging the wrongful exercise of power and encouraging im-
proved performance going forward. Of course, as with definitions of 
accountability more broadly, there are disputes amongst theorists as 
to whether all of these rationales are critical to achieving government 
accountability.26 For present purposes, it is not necessary to come to 
a landing on which rationale is most important and whether others 
ought to be disregarded. Instead, this article proceeds on the basis 
that accountability is broadly concerned with furthering each of these 
five goals, and focuses on the role played by the misfeasance tort in 
that context. 
At the outset, it is important to bear in mind that if we expect ac-
countability to perform the various tasks of supporting transparency, 
control, restoration, desert, and deterrence, there will be circumstanc-
es in which these goals will come into conflict with one another. For 
instance, the transparency rationale might appear to demand a very 
open accountability regime, pursuant to which there would be a gen-
eral right of access to government information. However, this might 
place the transparency rationale in potential conflict with the deter-
rence rationale, which is concerned with fostering improved perfor-
mance; as O’Neill puts it, ‘[p]lants don’t flourish when we pull them up 
too often to check how their roots are growing’.27 A further example of 
potential tension might be between the desert and deterrence ration-
ales. We might think that the desert rationale is best served through 
                                                     
 26 For instance, some would view accountability as focused only on the obligation to 
provide an account, and dispute the relevance of punishment for the content of that 
account: see, eg, Philp (n 7) 37–8. 
 
 27 Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 19, quoted 
in Jane Mansbridge, ‘A Contingency Theory of Accountability’ in Mark Bovens, 
Robert E Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2014) 55, 57. 
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the imposition of highly punitive sanctions in order to carry the requi-
site degree of condemnation that is appropriate in responding to 
abuses of public power. However, there is a risk that such an ap-
proach might undermine the deterrence rationale, as highly punitive 
sanctions carry a risk of producing a defiant reaction which may lead 
to a reduction, rather than improvement, in performance.28 
All of this tells us that we need either to narrow our expectations of 
accountability, or to be conscious of these potential tensions in de-
signing and analysing accountability mechanisms. We can choose 
either to tailor our mechanisms to suit a single rationale of accounta-
bility, or to attempt to find a ‘middle ground’ that goes some way to-
wards accommodating both rationales. This article demonstrates that 
the tort of misfeasance in public office is a good reflection of this ‘mid-
dle ground’ approach. 
II  The Misfeasance Tort within the Accountability Framework 
As our ‘only truly public law tort’,29 it is clear why we might be particu-
larly interested in the tort of misfeasance in public office for the pur-
pose of facilitating government accountability.30 This section utilises 
the accountability framework set out in Part I to map out the scope of 
the tort in that context. 
A  Who Is Subject to Liability? 
Misfeasance in public office is limited in its application to ‘public offic-
ers’.31 Courts have indicated that ‘[i]t is not sufficient merely to be em-
                                                     
 28 See John Braithwaite, ‘On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected 
Dimensions of a Republican Separation of Powers’ (1997) 47(3) University of 
Toronto Law Journal 305, 322–4. Braithwaite explores the concept of ‘reactance’, 
which is ‘greatest when the freedom subjected to control is something the regulated 
actor deeply cares about’: at 322. 
 
 29 Aronson, ‘Unfinished Business’ (n 2) 428. 
 
 30 Carol Harlow, Understanding Tort Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2005) 142–4. 
 
 31 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 370 (Deane J) (‘Mengel’); Dunlop 
v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158, 172 (Lord Diplock for the Court) 
(Privy Council) (‘Dunlop’). 
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ployed by a public authority for public purposes’.32 Instead, the posi-
tion held by a government official must entail a ‘relevant power’ and 
‘one to which [public] duties attach in the discharge of which the public 
has an interest’.33 In Obeid v Lockley (‘Obeid’),34 a recent Australian 
misfeasance case, Bathurst CJ noted that ‘the degree of “attachment”’ 
required between the office and the power was ‘not entirely clear’,35 
though his Honour accepted that it was not necessary to point to an 
express link.36 For his Honour, the definition of public officer would ‘at 
least include persons who, by virtue of the particular positions they 
hold, are entitled to exercise executive powers in the public interest’.37 
On this basis, Bathurst CJ was willing to accept that ‘senior investiga-
tors’ of the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Cor-
ruption were ‘public officers’.38 Although the investigators did not hold 
formal offices, his Honour had no doubt that they were ‘exercising the 
functions of a public officer, namely, the performance of their role as 
“senior investigators” which … they were obliged to carry out in the 
public interest’.39 As it stands, the tort has also been pleaded against 
officials ranging from government Ministers,40 to police officers,41 and 
                                                     
 32 Leerdam v Noori (2009) 255 ALR 553, 556 [16] (Spigelman CJ) (New South Wales 
Court of Appeal) (‘Leerdam’). 
 
 33 Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317, 337 [49]–[50] (Winneke P, Charles and Cher-
nov JJA) (‘Cannon’). 
 
 34 (2018) 355 ALR 615 (Supreme Court of New South Wales) (‘Obeid’). 
 
 35 Ibid 638 [97]. 
 
 36 Ibid 640 [103]. 
 
 37 Ibid 642 [114]. See also at 658 [206] (Beazley P), 659 [212] (Leeming JA). 
 
 38 Ibid 642 [118]. 
 
 39 Ibid. 
 
 40 Cornwall v Rowan (2004) 90 SASR 269, 334 [257] (Bleby, Besanko and Sulan JJ) 
(‘Cornwall’), cited in Jim Davis, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office, Exemplary Damages 
and Vicarious Liability’ (2010) 64 AIAL Forum 59, 60. 
 
 41 Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286, cited in Davis (n 40) 60–1. 
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to planning officers within a local council.42 However, the tort may not 
extend to offices in respect of which there is no duty owed to the pub-
lic, such as that of a prosecutor,43 a solicitor representing a Minister in 
tribunal proceedings,44 or public servants more generally.45 Aronson 
has argued for a wider application of the tort than that envisaged by 
these cases, suggesting that there is no reason to limit the tort to 
those who, in a strict sense, are ‘holders’ of a ‘public office’, and that it 
should extend to public servants more broadly.46 He responds to con-
cerns about the extension of liability to low-level officials by noting that 
the tort would remain confined by reference to the burdensome fault 
elements that require intentional or consciously reckless wrongdo-
ing.47 Low-level officials, Aronson suggests, are unlikely to conscious-
ly consider the legality of their conduct, let alone proceed in the face of 
suspected illegality.48 
A further interesting question arises as to the extended application 
of the tort in the context of outsourced powers. As the law presently 
stands, a private contractor exercising outsourced powers is unlikely 
to fall within the meaning of ‘public officer’ for the purpose of the tort. 
                                                                                                                  
 
 42 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council [No 6] (2011) 185 LGERA 
276, 337–8 [270]–[273] (Johnson J) (Supreme Court of New South Wales). 
 
 43 Cannon (n 33) 342–7 [61]–[76] (Winneke P, Charles and Chernov JJA). This can be 
compared with the approach taken in other jurisdictions: see, eg, Elguzouli-Daf v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1995] QB 335, 347 (Steyn LJ, Rose and 
Morritt LJJ agreeing) (England and Wales Court of Appeal); Milgaard v Kujawa 
(1994) 118 DLR (4th) 653, 660–1 (Sherstobitoff JA for the Court) (Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal). For discussion, see Erika Chamberlain, Misfeasance in a Public 
Office (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 108–11. 
 
 44 Leerdam (n 32) 558 [25]–[26] (Spigelman CJ), 564 [58] (Allsop P). 
 
 45 See Obeid (n 34) 641–2 [113] (Bathurst CJ). 
 
 46 Mark Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort’ (2011) 35(1) 
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 49–50 (‘A Very Peculiar Tort’). 
 
 47 Ibid 50. 
 
 48 Ibid. 
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In New South Wales v Roberson,49 Basten JA was not required to 
determine whether a doctor exercising statutory powers would be cap-
tured by the tort, noting in obiter that ‘in an age when many statutory 
functions (including basic custodial services) are “contracted out”, the 
scope of the tort (as with the scope of judicial review) remains uncer-
tain’.50 Aronson has forcefully argued that the tort should indeed ex-
tend to private contractors.51 In his view: 
The essence of misfeasance is surely that it is a deliberate abuse of 
public power, and it should be no excuse that a particular defendant is 
not subject to the internal disciplinary processes of the public service. If 
anything, that should be seen as an argument for liability, because 
there are fewer alternative remedies against the contractor.52 
While the extension of judicial review to private contractors is an issue 
that has received some attention,53 the scope of the ‘public officer’ 
element of the tort of misfeasance in public office appears, to date, to 
have been defined more in institutional, rather than functional, terms.54 
There has been no real shift in approach that would see private con-
tractors held liable for the tort simply on the basis that they are per-
forming public functions.55 
There are also serious doubts as to whether the misfeasance tort is 
                                                     
 49 (2016) 338 ALR 166 (New South Wales Court of Appeal). 
 
 50 Ibid 183 [75]. 
 
 51 Aronson, ‘A Very Peculiar Tort’ (n 46) 49. 
 
 52 Ibid (emphasis omitted). 
 
 53 The case of R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 
QB 815 is relevant in that context and is discussed in Mark Aronson, Matthew 
Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government 
Liability (Lawbook, 6th ed, 2017) 149–56 [3.180]–[3.200]. 
 
 54 This may be viewed in contrast to the position adopted in the United Kingdom: see, 
eg, Aronson, ‘Unfinished Business’ (n 2) 436–7. 
 
 55 In Obeid (n 34), Bathurst CJ noted that the Australian approach ‘is not as broad’ as 
the English approach in this respect: at 641 [113]. 
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capable of accommodating notions of corporate liability.56 There are 
cases in which an entity (such as a local council) has been considered 
capable of committing the tort. For instance, in Dunlop v Woollahra 
Municipal Council,57 Lord Diplock approved of the approach taken by 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales in accepting that the Council 
was a public officer for the purpose of the tort.58 Similarly, in Nyoni v 
Shire of Kellerberrin (‘Nyoni’),59 North and Rares JJ found that the 
malicious conduct of the CEO of the Shire of Kellerberrin ‘should be 
imputed’ to his employer.60 For their Honours, the CEO ‘was the mind 
of the Shire … and, because he was “the hands and brains” of the 
Shire, the Shire became directly (and not vicariously) liable for any 
misfeasance in public office’.61 On a broader scale, Gray J in Tre-
vorrow v South Australia [No 5]62 found that the State and the Aborigi-
nes Protection Board were directly liable for misfeasance in public 
office for harm suffered by an Aboriginal child as a result of his illegal 
removal from his family.63 Critical to that finding were the facts that the 
removal was effected pursuant to government policy, that various 
Crown Ministers and employees held positions on the Board, that the 
Board acted ‘as an emanation and agent of the State’, and that the 
State in effect ‘authorised the conduct’.64 On appeal, the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of South Australia altered the character of the 
                                                     
 56 But see Hart-Roach v Public Trustee (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Murray 
J, 11 February 1998) 17. 
 
 57 Dunlop (n 31). 
 
 58 Ibid 172. 
 
 59 (2017) 248 FCR 311 (‘Nyoni’). 
 
 60 Ibid 329 [85]. Special leave was refused: Transcript of Proceedings, Shire of 
Kellerberrin v Nyoni [2018] HCATrans 27. 
 
 61 Nyoni (n 59) 329 [85]. 
 
 62 (2007) 98 SASR 136 (‘Trevorrow [No 5]’). 
 
 63 Ibid 338 [978]–[981]. 
 
 64 Ibid 338 [980]. 
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State’s liability to vicarious, as opposed to direct (see below).65 How-
ever, the Court was prepared to accept that the Board met the de-
scription of a public officer, notwithstanding its corporate nature.66 
In contrast with these cases, there are statements to the effect that 
corporate entities cannot engage in misfeasance in public office. In 
Emanuele v Hedley,67 one of the claims made was that the Common-
wealth was directly liable for misfeasance.68 The Court indicated that 
it is a legal nonsense to suggest there can be conduct of the Common-
wealth itself that constitutes a misfeasance in public office. The Com-
monwealth of Australia is a legal entity created by the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp). It is a juristic person but, of 
course, is incapable of acting except through agents. It is incapable it-
self of committing misfeasance in public office; it does not hold public 
office.69 
Similarly, in Bailey v Director General, Department of Natural Re-
sources,70 Fullerton J was critical of the nomination of the Water Ad-
ministration Ministerial Corporation as a defendant in a misfeasance in 
public office claim, stating that ‘[a] ministerial corporation cannot be a 
public officer on any view’.71 This approach is at odds with that adopt-
ed in the United Kingdom, pursuant to which various corporate-style 
entities have been held liable for the tort.72 While institutions cannot 
                                                     
 65 South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331, 390 [275] (Doyle CJ, 
Duggan and White JJ) (‘Lampard-Trevorrow’). See below 349. 
 
 66 Ibid 388 [265]–[266] (Doyle CJ, Duggan and White JJ). 
 
 67 (1998) 179 FCR 290. 
 
 68 The Court wondered why the claims had been framed as misfeasance; the nature of 
the allegations fell more squarely within the torts of abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution: ibid 300 [36] (Wilcox, Miles and RD Nicholson JJ). 
 
 69 Ibid. 
 
 70 [2014] NSWSC 1012. 
 
 71 Ibid [531], cited in Aronson, ‘Unfinished Business’ (n 2) 437. 
 
 72 See, eg, Aronson, ‘A Very Peculiar Tort’ (n 46) 43–4; Aronson, ‘Unfinished 
Business’ (n 2) 437–8. 
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themselves maintain a mental state that would satisfy the intentional 
requirements of the tort, the cases cited in the preceding paragraph 
certainly demonstrate the possibility of imputing to an institution the 
mental states of its agents.73 If followed, this approach might lead to 
the result that the bad faith actions of an individual member of a cor-
poration are taken to be the bad faith actions of the corporation itself. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that, even on this extended 
model of corporate accountability, the corporation’s intention cannot 
become more than the sum of its parts: ‘The good faith mistakes and 
incompetence of a range of individuals within an organisation cannot 
be amalgamated to create the basis for inferring or imputing a “com-
posite” bad faith to a fictional and “composite” officer.’74 An example of 
a case adopting this approach is Chapel Road Pty Ltd v Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission [No 10],75 in which Schmidt J 
indicated that bad faith on the part of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission ‘cannot be established simply by aggregat-
ing the acts of various public officers, or establishing a course of con-
duct, which it is claimed was improper or tainted in some way’.76 All of 
this tells us that there remains some doubt as to whether government 
entities (whether statutory bodies or the state itself) will, in all cases, 
be capable of characterisation as a ‘public officer’, and how the inten-
tion of individuals might be imputed to an entity for the purpose of the 
tort. 
There is also some dispute as to the extent to which the misfea-
sance tort accommodates the hierarchical accountability model, which 
in this context would be reflected in the notion of vicarious liability. In 
Northern Territory v Mengel (‘Mengel’),77 the High Court indicated that 
the usual position is that ‘although the tort is the tort of a public officer, 
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he or she is liable personally and, unless there is de facto authority, 
there will ordinarily only be personal liability’.78 This passage points to 
the availability of vicarious liability where there is de facto authority.79 
While there are Australian authorities that have cautioned against 
reading the passage in Mengel as an unqualified denial of the possibil-
ity of vicarious liability outside cases of de facto authority,80 doubt re-
mains as to how far this might extend. The difficulty stems from the 
intentional nature of the tort, as vicarious liability is framed by refer-
ence to wrongful acts of employees committed ‘in the course or scope 
of employment’.81 As Vines puts it, ‘[t]he wrong in misfeasance in pub-
lic office has been described as something which is an “abuse of of-
fice”, and surely an abuse of an office could not be regarded as within 
the course of employment for that office’.82 
One of the cases cited in Mengel was the English case of Racz v 
Home Office.83 In refusing to strike out a pleading of vicarious liability 
for misfeasance in public office, Lord Jauncey accepted the plaintiff’s 
submission that the relevant question was whether ‘the prison officers 
were engaged in a misguided and unauthorised method of performing 
their authorised duties or were engaged in what was tantamount to an 
unlawful frolic of their own’.84 In South Australia v Lampard-
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Trevorrow,85 the Court applied this reasoning, finding the State vicari-
ously liable for the misfeasance of its officers on the basis that the 
officers ‘acted in apparent performance of their [statutory] duties’ and 
in the belief that their actions were ‘for the benefit of the public and of 
the State’ rather than for personal gain.86 
It is also useful to bear in mind that misfeasance in public office is 
not the only cause of action where vicarious liability and intentional 
wrongdoing might collide. In Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC,87 the 
High Court considered the College’s vicarious liability in circumstanc-
es where its employee had sexually abused a student. The High Court 
identified a number of factors that might assist in deciding whether 
such conduct fell within the scope of employment, including: (a) ‘any 
special role that the employer has assigned to the employee and the 
position in which the employee is thereby placed vis-à-vis the victim’;88 
(b) ‘whether the apparent performance of such a role may be said to 
give the “occasion” for the wrongful act … [including taking] into ac-
count … authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve inti-
macy with the victim’;89 and (c) whether ‘the employee used or took 
advantage of the position in which the employment placed the em-
ployee vis-à-vis the victim’.90 These factors are particularly relevant in 
the context of the misfeasance tort, which can only be made out in 
respect of abuse of public powers, reflected in the requirement that 
the officer’s act be done ‘in the purported discharge of his or her public 
duties’.91 As Aronson puts it, the types of wrongdoing captured by the 
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misfeasance tort are of a kind that in most cases can ‘only be commit-
ted “on the job”’.92 
To summarise, in looking at who can be held accountable pursuant 
to the tort of misfeasance in public office, only a subset of government 
officials will fall within the scope of the ‘public office’ requirement. 
There remain doubts as to the reach of the tort into the realms of cor-
porate accountability (ie direct liability of government entities) and hi-
erarchical accountability (ie vicarious liability for the acts of a govern-
ment employee). 
B  To Whom Is the Government Accountable? 
The second aspect of the accountability framework looks at the party 
to whom an agent is accountable. There are really two levels of ac-
countability holders in this context.93 At one level, we might view the 
court as the body to whom an agent is required to account for the pur-
pose of the misfeasance tort.94 It is unnecessary to engage in any de-
tailed analysis of the role of the courts as an accountability forum in 
this context, as this work has been done elsewhere.95 For present 
purposes, it is the second level of accountability holder that is relevant 
to consider, namely the party who is entitled to bring an agent before 
the accountability forum. In tort law, issues of standing are wrapped 
up in the nature of the cause of action, rather than being determined 
through standalone tests of eligibility to make a claim: ‘In private law 
there is, in general, no separation of standing from the elements in a 
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cause of action.’96 In order to determine to whom a government de-
fendant is accountable in tort, we must look at the content of the rele-
vant cause of action. For the purpose of the misfeasance tort, two el-
ements of the cause of action in particular operate as delimiting devic-
es to mark out the range of individuals entitled to commence proceed-
ings. 
The first delimiting device is the mental element(s) of the misfea-
sance tort.97 Each of the two types of misfeasance claim (ie targeted 
malice and reckless exercise of powers) place the defendant in the 
driving seat in marking out the category of individuals to whom they 
might be liable. In cases of targeted malice, a direct line is created 
between the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant in such a case has 
consciously considered the interests of the plaintiff and has acted ei-
ther with the intention of causing harm, or not caring that this would be 
the result of their actions. As noted in Sanders v Snell [No 2],98 for the 
purpose of this limb of the tort, public power is employed ‘as a means 
of inflicting harm’.99 The second limb of the tort — reckless exercise of 
powers — also places the plaintiff in the contemplation of the defend-
ant. This is because the tort cannot be made out merely in cases of 
‘foreseeable’ harm, but instead requires the defendant to have ‘fore-
seen’ the harm likely to be occasioned.100 While there had been some 
doubt expressed as to whether the High Court in Mengel might have 
extended the tort to cases where loss was reasonably foreseeable,101 
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the New South Wales Court of Appeal recently indicated in Obeid that 
this was a misreading of Mengel.102 Bathurst CJ was firmly of the view 
that it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
was aware that their conduct would cause harm, or was recklessly 
indifferent to such a risk.103 The defendant, therefore, must have ad-
verted to the plaintiff’s interests at some level, and decided to proceed 
irrespective of the harm that was likely to result.104 We can say, there-
fore, that for both limbs of the tort, the individuals to whom a govern-
ment defendant may be accountable are marked out by some degree 
of subjective contemplation by the defendant (whether conscious or 
recklessly indifferent), and, in this sense, the defendant plays a large 
role in determining to whom they are liable. 
A second delimiting device employed by the misfeasance tort is the 
requirement of loss or damage.105 Unlike those torts which are action-
able per se,106 the misfeasance tort is derived from the historical ac-
tion on the case,107 meaning that proof of damage is an essential ele-
ment for liability. This is demonstrated by the plaintiff’s failure in the 
English case of Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment (‘Watkins’).108 In that case, prison officers were found to have 
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acted ultra vires and in bad faith by opening the plaintiff’s legal corre-
spondence. The plaintiff sought to establish misfeasance in public of-
fice either on the basis that the tort was actionable per se, or alterna-
tively, that some lesser degree of anxiety (‘distress, injured feelings, 
indignation or annoyance’) was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of 
loss or damage.109 The House of Lords rejected the claim, confirming 
that, as an action on the case, proof of material damage was an es-
sential element of the tort.110 Therefore, the category of individuals to 
whom a government official will be liable pursuant to this tort is con-
fined to those who suffer material loss or damage by reason of the 
defendant’s conduct. 
Having said this, the recognised forms of material loss and damage 
are relatively broad, extending beyond personal injury and property 
damage to pure economic loss, psychological harm, and loss of repu-
tation.111 Recently, the Full Federal Court in Nyoni was willing to infer 
material damage where one government agent represented to another 
that Mr Nyoni was unfit to continue to conduct his pharmacy business: 
‘The making of such an allegation … should be presumed (as it would 
in cases of slander) to cause sufficient material or actual damage to 
support the action of misfeasance in public office’.112 While it remains 
necessary, therefore, for a plaintiff to point to a recognised form of 
harm, the court may be more willing to infer harm in cases involving 
malicious conduct aimed at affecting the plaintiff’s reputation (or, at 
least, business reputation). 
C  For What Does the Misfeasance Tort Hold an Agent 
Accountable? 
The tort of misfeasance in public office provides a remedy in damages 
for: ‘(i) an invalid or unauthorised act; (ii) done maliciously; (iii) by a 
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public officer; (iv) in the purported discharge of his or her public duties; 
(v) which causes loss or harm to the plaintiff’.113 The third, fourth, and 
fifth of these elements (namely, the definition of ‘public officer’, the 
requirement that the agent’s conduct be sufficiently linked with official 
functions, and the requirement of proof of damage) have been dis-
cussed above. It is the remaining elements of the tort that are most 
relevant for considering for what an official is held accountable. 
1 An Invalid or Unauthorised Act 
To understand the meaning of ‘invalid or unauthorised’, it is useful to 
contrast the scope of the tort with the now-defunct Beaudesert tort,114 
which purported to make a remedy in damages available for the ‘un-
lawful, intentional and positive acts of another’.115 In that context, ‘un-
lawful’ was used not in the public law sense of ‘an act that is ultra vires 
and void’, but was instead interpreted to mean ‘an act forbidden by 
law’.116 The misfeasance tort, in contrast, encompasses both illegal 
conduct in the traditional sense (eg fabrication of evidence, forgery, 
and cover-ups by police officers),117 as well as more technical in-
stances of illegality as understood in judicial review proceedings. As 
noted by Brennan J in Mengel: 
[T]he purported exercise of power must be invalid, either because there 
is no power to be exercised or because a purported exercise of the 
power has miscarried by reason of some matter which warrants judicial 
review and a setting aside of the administrative action.118 
Accordingly, the meaning of ‘invalid or unauthorised’ is in part in-
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formed by our understandings of the grounds on which a decision 
might be set aside in judicial review proceedings. It is also important to 
bear in mind that ‘unlawfulness’ in this context is limited to the abuse 
of public power, touched on in the discussion of ‘public office’ 
above.119 For this reason, an official who happens to be in uniform 
while committing a crime entirely unrelated to their public functions will 
not commit the tort of misfeasance.120 
2 Causation 
In addition to the requirement that the loss be of a type recognised by 
the tort of misfeasance in public office,121 it is further necessary to 
demonstrate that there exists a requisite link between the conduct 
complained of and the harm occasioned. Tort law employs concepts 
of causation to mark out the boundaries of outcomes attributable to 
impugned conduct, most commonly by asking whether the harm would 
have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct (factual causation),122 and wheth-
er the outcome ought to be treated as a cause in law (attributive cau-
sation).123 In many cases, determining whether an official’s excess of 
power has caused the plaintiff’s loss may be straightforward. This may 
be the case, for instance, where the government official had no juris-
diction to act in the first place (ie simple ultra vires). However, the sit-
uation becomes more complicated where the nature of the error is 
such that the same act could potentially have been performed within 
power (eg where the same decision could be made having afforded a 
fair hearing or ignoring the irrelevant consideration).124 After all, most 
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species of public law ‘unlawfulness’ are concerned not with the sub-
stance of the ultimate decision, but with the means by which that deci-
sion is reached. This problem is particularly evident in respect of pow-
ers that are discretionary in nature. As noted in Lock v Australian Se-
curities and Investments Commission:125 
The causation question requires consideration of what the relevant pub-
lic officer would have done if there had been no such deliberate omis-
sion. In the case of an unlawful decision not to exercise a discretionary 
power, there may have been a range of alternative lawful decisions, 
one of which might include a lawful decision not to exercise the pow-
er.126 
Although the matter did not need to be determined in that case, the 
implication is that causation may be difficult to establish in cases 
where there is more than one legal way in which power might be exer-
cised. This particular causation issue is one that must be confronted 
by advocates of a public law remedy in damages (ie damages for ille-
gality per se).127 The crux of the difficulty is that, in determining 
whether harm would have occurred ‘but for’ the illegality complained 
of, the court is being asked implicitly to determine how the discretion-
ary power should have been exercised, potentially moving the court 
into forbidden merits review territory. 
The English courts confronted this difficulty in the context of the tort 
of false imprisonment in R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.128 In that case, the substance of the plaintiffs’ claim was 
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that their detention was unlawful because the Home Department had 
operated in reliance on an unpublished and unlawful policy.129 Rele-
vantly, however, the plaintiffs would still have been detained if the de-
cision-maker had instead relied on the applicable published and lawful 
policy.130 Applying what was described as ‘the causation test’, the trial 
judge and the Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the basis that the 
detention was inevitable; the application of the unlawful policy was of 
no ‘causative effect’ because the lawful policy dictated the same re-
sult.131 This approach was rejected by a majority of the Supreme 
Court, with Lord Dyson JSC indicating that there was ‘no place for a 
causation test’ in the context of the tort of false imprisonment.132 In his 
Lordship’s view: 
Where the power has not been lawfully exercised, it is nothing to the 
point that it could have been lawfully exercised. If the power could and 
would have been lawfully exercised, that is a powerful reason for con-
cluding that the detainee has suffered no loss and is entitled to no more 
than nominal damages. But that is not a reason for holding that the tort 
has not been committed.133 
To adopt the words of Lord Kerr JSC, ‘[t]he fact that a person could 
have been lawfully detained says nothing on the question whether he 
was lawfully detained’.134 Nominal damages could therefore be 
awarded in recognition of the fact that the defendant’s chosen justifi-
cation for detention was an unlawful one, reserving higher quantum 
awards for cases in which there was no available legal justification, 
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thereby giving rise to material loss.135 
It may at first glance be tempting to extrapolate this reasoning 
across to misfeasance cases,136 treating the illegality of the defend-
ant’s chosen justification as determinative irrespective of whether or 
not an alternative legal path was open. However, there remains a criti-
cal point of difference between the two species of tort — while false 
imprisonment is actionable per se,137 courts have maintained a strict 
hold on the damage requirement for the misfeasance tort, as outlined 
above.138 The use of nominal damages to serve a non-compensatory 
purpose,139 circumventing the question of causation, is therefore a 
much smaller step to take in that context. Put simply, the cases have 
not yet gone far enough to tell us how these difficult causation ques-
tions might be resolved for the purpose of the misfeasance tort.140 
3 Malice 
The final element of the misfeasance tort to consider, in looking at for 
what an agent is held accountable, is the requirement that the act be 
‘done maliciously’.141 This mental element of the tort has been de-
scribed as comprising ‘two alternative “limbs”’.142 The first is that of 
‘targeted malice’,143 which captures ‘actual intention to cause such 
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injury’,144 or conduct either ‘specifically intended to injure a person’145 
or engaged in ‘with the predominant intent of damaging a person’.146 
The second limb, which addresses a knowingly or recklessly unlawful 
act that causes damage, captures both deliberate wrongdoing and 
recklessness in the sense of ‘deliberate blindness’.147 In other words, 
the tort requires a degree of ‘conscious maladministration’,148 either in 
the form of intention to cause harm (or recklessness as to harm aris-
ing), or intention to exceed powers (or recklessness as to legality). 
It is further worth making the point that it is likely not possible to ar-
gue against liability for ‘malicious’ conduct on the basis that the act 
was otherwise within power. While it has been suggested that ‘spite or 
an intention to harm are not sufficient [to make out the tort] if the ac-
tion is in fact lawful’,149 the better view is that spiteful or malicious 
conduct is unlikely to ever be considered ‘otherwise lawful’; such con-
duct would likely contravene the judicial review grounds of improper 
purpose and bad faith.150 This leads to the conclusion that a plaintiff 
does not need to identify a separate ground of illegality (such as a 
failure to accord procedural fairness) in cases of targeted malice, but 
can rely on that conduct itself to establish an excess of power. 
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D  How Is an Agent Held Accountable? 
The question of how an agent is held accountable encompasses two 
levels of enquiry. The first considers the process by which accounta-
bility is delivered (ie procedural aspects of the court process), and the 
second considers the final result of that process (ie court orders). As 
noted above, others have already considered the more general contri-
bution that the courts make to government accountability.151 Returning 
to the various rationales for accountability set out above,152 there is 
much to recommend judicial process for the purpose of meeting these 
ends. Transparency is fostered in a number of ways. Perhaps most 
critically, courts contribute to transparency through the open nature of 
the court forum and through the publication of judicial reasons.153 
Government transparency is further facilitated through the use of pre-
trial and in-court procedures to compel the production of documents 
and evidence from government defendants, including discovery, sub-
poenas, interrogatories, pleadings, and cross-examination.154 The tort 
of misfeasance in public office enjoys all of these transparency-
oriented accountability benefits, providing citizens with a means to call 
a government official to explain and justify their conduct in a public 
forum. 
The remaining results-oriented rationales for accountability are 
then supported through the provision of remedies and sanctions.155 
The archetypal remedy in tort proceedings is an award of damages.156 
While damages are, in essence, a reparative remedy aligned with the 
restorative rationale for accountability, they can also be viewed as 
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contributing to a number of the other accountability rationales: ‘Money 
is probably the most frequently used means of punishing, deterring, 
compensating and regulating throughout the legal system.’157 When 
awarded in the context of the tort of misfeasance in public office, com-
pensatory and punitive damages can each be understood to contrib-
ute to a number of accountability rationales. Compensatory damages 
provide an individual with a monetary payment to make up for pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary loss, damage, or injury that they have sus-
tained.158 In this context, the aim of the award is to place the plaintiff in 
the same position as they would have been in but for the defendant’s 
wrong.159 This rationale is well aligned with the restorative function of 
accountability, providing individuals who have suffered loss with a 
monetary payment designed to repair that loss; the tort is ‘designed to 
provide redress for acts done by public officers in abuse or misuse of 
powers conferred on them for the purpose of their public duties’.160 
Punitive (or exemplary) damages are also available for the purpose 
of the misfeasance tort.161 Punitive damages align well with the desert 
rationale for accountability, not only in terms of their purpose, but also 
in terms of the circumstances in which the award is thought to be ap-
propriate. Punitive damages are thought to be appropriate in cases 
where a defendant’s ‘conduct is sufficiently outrageous to merit pun-
ishment, as where it discloses malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence or the 
like’,162 or in response to ‘conscious wrongdoing in contumelious dis-
                                                     
157 Pat O’Malley, The Currency of Justice: Fines and Damages in Consumer Societies 
(Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 1. 
 
158 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th ed, 2014) 13. 
 
159 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39, cited in McGregor (n 
158) 14. 
 
160 Obeid (n 34) 639 [100] (Bathurst CJ). 
 
161 There remains dispute as to whether aggravated damages fall into this same cate-
gory: see, eg, Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) 114; 
Allan Beever, ‘The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages’ (2003) 23(1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 87. If we conceive of aggravated damages as plain-
tiff-focused (ie appeasing a perceived indignity) as opposed to defendant-focused 
(ie punishing and deterring), it is convenient to hive off aggravated damages in the 
context of the present discussion. Otherwise, little turns on this dispute. 
 
162 McGregor (n 158) 454. 
2019] Misfeasance in Public Office: A Tort in Tension 365 
regard of another’s rights’.163 Though it is not necessary to establish 
that the defendant’s conduct was malicious in order to obtain a puni-
tive damages award, it does appear necessary to establish a minimum 
level of conscious engagement on the part of the defendant, in the 
form of intentional or reckless behaviour.164 Australian courts have not 
followed the restrictive approach of the English courts represented by 
the decision of Rookes v Barnard (‘Rookes’),165 in which the House of 
Lords fixed the availability of punitive damages to already-recognised 
categories of cases.166 Even within that restrictive approach, however, 
punitive damages have been made available for egregious conduct by 
government officials. In Rookes, Lord Devlin was concerned to main-
tain the availability of punitive damages in response to ‘arbitrary and 
outrageous use of executive power’,167 as in cases of ‘oppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the govern-
ment’.168 
Punitive damages are particularly apt in the context of the tort of 
misfeasance in public office.169 As outlined above,170 this tort involves 
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a serious degree of subjective fault on the part of the official con-
cerned, which may invite the conclusion that punitive damages will be 
available in every case where a claim is made out. However, courts 
appear to require something more than the elements of subjective 
fault comprised in the misfeasance tort before awarding punitive dam-
ages. In Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary 
(‘Kuddus’),171 Lord Hutton accepted that punitive damages may be 
available in respect of oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional acts by 
government officials, but expressed the view that ‘not every abuse of 
power which constitutes the tort of misfeasance will come within [that] 
category’.172 In order for punitive damages to be relevant, therefore, 
the plaintiff must show something more than the degree of subjective 
fault that constitutes the tort itself. 
Like the desert rationale for accountability, punitive damages focus 
primarily on the individual wrongdoer rather than on the victim.173 This 
is because the purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish and 
mark public disapproval of the wrongdoer’s conduct.174 As put by 
Chamberlain, making punitive damages available in misfeasance cas-
es ‘is necessary to express a sense of public outrage at the misuse of 
the powers that were granted to the official to exercise in the public 
interest’.175 The availability of punitive damages further serves the im-
portant constitutional function of ‘uphold[ing] and vindicat[ing] the rule 
of law’,176 or, in Harlow’s words, represents ‘a constitutional principle 
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of symbolic importance’.177 Not only is the purpose of a punitive dam-
ages award closely aligned to the accountability rationale of desert, it 
can also be viewed as contributing to the higher theoretical goal of 
supporting the legitimacy of government. 
It is also worth noting that, even in the absence of an award of pu-
nitive damages, misfeasance proceedings may play a potentially puni-
tive role in maintaining government accountability. The process of ap-
pearing in court to answer to a claim of misfeasance, along with find-
ings of malice or knowing recklessness, can be imagined to be an un-
pleasant and embarrassing experience even aside from the imposition 
of damages liability. As Bovens puts it, public acknowledgement of a 
failure to comply with prescribed norms may in some circumstances 
be ‘particularly painful’, in which case ‘sanctions [are] therefore pre-
sent in the very process of being held responsible’.178 If we accept that 
a finding of liability for misfeasance in public office (and attendant 
compensatory damages) carries a potentially punitive effect, the 
award of punitive damages then serves a function of reinforcing that 
stigma in more egregious cases. 
Beyond restoration and desert, we might wonder whether the rem-
edies available in misfeasance claims have a potential deterrent func-
tion. For many, the idea of tort law as a tool of deterrence is ‘in-
nate’,179 although, as Harlow notes, ‘[d]eterrent theories of tort law are 
today hard to come by’.180 More recent academic attention has fo-
cused instead on attempting to discern the impact of tort remedies as 
an empirical matter, with varying degrees of success.181 Whatever we 
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think of the potential utility of compensatory damages as a tool of de-
terrence, there are far stronger claims supporting the deterrent effect 
of punitive damages. Reflections of this rationale were evident even in 
the seminal misfeasance case of Ashby v White,182 where Holt CJ 
stated that ‘[i]f publick officers will infringe mens rights, they ought to 
pay greater damages than other men, to deter and hinder other offic-
ers from the like offences’.183 To similar effect, Lord Hutton in Kuddus 
indicated that 
the power to award exemplary damages in such cases … serves to de-
ter such actions in future as such awards will bring home to officers in 
command of individual units that discipline must be maintained at all 
times. In my respectful opinion the view is not fanciful … that such 
awards have a deterrent effect …184 
Lord Scott was less convinced, at least in cases where liability was to 
be borne not by the individual wrongdoer but by their employer.185 
There are also doubts as to whether personal liability to pay puni-
tive damages has a deterrent effect, or whether there is a risk that 
such punitive sanctions may be counterproductive (particularly in cas-
es of abuse of power). Braithwaite’s review of a range of empirical 
(primarily criminological) research led him to conclude that the threat 
of sanction may not be a useful deterrent in this context.186 According 
to this research, there are a range of reasons why ‘big sticks often 
rebound’.187 For instance, in some cases an individual may respond to 
a threat of sanction with defiance: by ‘getting mad rather than by ceas-
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ing to be bad’.188 The level of reactance (ie the motivation to act to 
regain a freedom that has been lost or threatened)189 may be affected 
by factors such as the actor’s level of emotionality or the importance of 
the freedom under threat.190 While the threat of sanction might pro-
duce gains in some contexts, the risk of backfire, Braithwaite con-
cludes, leads to a potentially nil overall effect.191 Courts have also 
acknowledged this risk in connection with the misfeasance tort, noting 
that the ‘[i]nappropriate imposition of liability on public officials may 
deter officials from exercising powers conferred on them when their 
exercise would be for the public good’.192 
III  The Misfeasance Tort: Caught between Accountability 
Rationales 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the misfeasance tort is 
often said to be underpinned by three different objectives that can also 
more broadly be understood to be rationales of accountability: restora-
tion, desert, and deterrence. Because these three accountability ra-
tionales are at times in tension, the misfeasance tort reflects some-
thing of a compromise between competing positions. This is evident in 
the following aspects of the tort. 
First, the high-grade mental element of malice places a significant 
restriction on a plaintiff’s ability to obtain restoration. If the primary 
purpose of tort is to compensate loss, we might be concerned if this 
mental requirement contributes to low rates of success in misfeasance 
cases.193 But the high-grade nature of this mental element is perhaps 
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explicable when taking into account the desert rationale for accounta-
bility. Desert-oriented mechanisms are attended by notions of con-
demnation, stigma, and public disapproval. For this reason, we have 
difficulty extending punishment beyond the reaches of subjectively 
faulty conduct.194 This reluctance is well reflected in the misfeasance 
tort’s mental elements of intention and subjective recklessness, which 
apply both in relation to the impugned act itself and in relation to the 
harm likely to be suffered by the plaintiff. One way of viewing these 
mental elements is as a compromise between the primary restoration 
rationale and the subsidiary rationales of desert and deterrence. In 
Obeid, Bathurst CJ was of the opinion that the fault element strikes 
such a balance, noting that 
an approach which requires a plaintiff to establish that they were likely 
to suffer harm and that the defendant was either aware of or recklessly 
indifferent to that risk strikes a correct balance between, on the one 
hand, the inappropriate imposition of liability on public officers which 
may deter them from exercising powers conferred on them to be exer-
cised in the public interest, and on the other hand, the protection of 
persons affected by misuse or abuse of public power.195 
We can also view the misfeasance tort’s requirement of proof of dam-
age as a compromise between competing rationales. If the sole con-
cern of the tort was to condemn abuse of power (a reflection of the 
desert or deterrence rationales), we might say that this goal would be 
best served if the tort were actionable without proof of harm. Courts’ 
insistence that damage is the gist of the action196 might potentially be 
viewed as accommodating the restoration rationale for accountability, 
which is concerned with compensating harm. In Watkins, Lord Bing-
ham confirmed that the scope of the tort ought not to be expanded 
beyond this reach, noting: ‘I would not for my part develop the law of 
tort to make it an instrument of punishment in cases where there is no 
material damage for which to compensate.’197 While making the tort 
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actionable per se would potentially serve other plaintiff-oriented func-
tions (eg vindication),198 this is not an intrinsic function of the restora-
tion rationale. In this respect, we might view the desert and deterrence 
potential of the tort as tempered by the restoration rationale. 
We might make a similar observation in relation to the availability of 
punitive damages, which are treated not as a freestanding head of 
recovery but as an extension of compensatory damages.199 This 
means that punitive damages will be available only if compensatory 
damages are insufficient to facilitate punishment, and will be unavaila-
ble if the claim for compensation fails: ‘If there is no host, there can 
not be a parasite.’200 If our core concern was to facilitate punishment 
of wrongdoing, we might wonder why punitive damages are not avail-
able independently of compensatory damages. Again, however, we 
can view the prioritisation of compensatory damages as tempering the 
desert rationale by reference to the restoration rationale. 
The identification of the appropriate defendant in misfeasance 
claims also reveals a tension between rationales. It was noted above 
that the misfeasance tort is primarily conceived of as the personal tort 
of a public officer, and that the extension of the tort to encompass vi-
carious liability is the exception rather than the rule.201 If our primary 
concern was to facilitate restoration of wronged parties, we might 
question that approach; there can be little doubt that the government 
is better placed than individual officials to support compensation 
claims.202 The preference for individual liability might instead be 
viewed as a reflection of the desert and deterrence rationales. Shifting 
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liability to a government employer removes focus from the individual 
who engaged in the conduct warranting punishment, and there may 
be very real doubts as to the deterrent effects of a damages award 
borne by an employer.203 In this sense, we might view the reluctance 
to extend the misfeasance tort more widely into the realm of vicarious 
liability as a potential accommodation of these punitive rationales.204 
A further area of compromise between rationales can be viewed in 
connection with the applicable burden of proof. Adopting the ordinary 
civil standard, a plaintiff in a misfeasance claim must make out their 
case ‘on the balance of probabilities’.205 However, the nature of the 
allegations forming the tort’s mental elements move it into more diffi-
cult terrain. Unless an official has made an admission revealing their 
motives in a given situation, proof of state of mind is notoriously diffi-
cult,206 often becoming a matter of inference.207 Courts have reiterated 
that the requisite state of mind to establish the misfeasance tort ‘is a 
very serious allegation … [that] cannot be made in a broad brush 
way’.208 Although the standard of proof technically remains constant 
(being on the balance of probabilities), the Briginshaw principle209 
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governs proof of malicious intent.210 The result is that courts will not 
lightly find that a public officer has acted with malice, and will prefer to 
adopt an inference that is favourable to the public officer against 
whom such a serious accusation of wrongdoing has been made.211 
Further, costs implications may arise following a baseless allegation of 
bad faith or malice, particularly in the context of the exercise of public 
powers.212 We might say, therefore, that the restoration rationale gives 
way to the desert rationale in connection with the burden of proof for 
the mental elements of the misfeasance tort. 
All of these points lead us to the conclusion that the misfeasance 
tort reflects a compromise between various rationales, which are 
framed in this article as rationales for accountability. Striking an ap-
propriate balance in this compromise is no small task, as reflected by 
the comments of the High Court in Sanders v Snell: 
Misfeasance in public office is concerned with misuse of public power. 
Inappropriate imposition of liability on public officials may deter officials 
from exercising powers conferred on them when their exercise would 
be for the public good. But too narrow a definition of the ambit of liability 
may leave persons affected by an abuse of power uncompensated. The 
tort of misfeasance in public office must seek to balance these compet-
ing considerations. Not surprisingly, identifying the intention with which 
the public official acts has a prominent place in striking that balance.213 
IV  Conclusion 
This article has presented a picture of the tort of misfeasance in public 
office as an accountability mechanism, analysing its structure within 
the framework of who is accountable to whom, for what, and how? 
This analysis reveals that the misfeasance tort is underpinned by 
three rationales (restoration, desert, and deterrence), each of which 
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can also be understood as rationales for government accountability. 
Using this accountability framework, we can view the misfeasance tort 
as reflecting tensions between these rationales. Some tensions pull in 
the direction of the restoration rationale (eg the requirement of proof of 
damage and the prioritisation of compensatory over punitive damag-
es), whereas others pull in the direction of the desert or deterrence 
rationales (eg the high-grade fault element, limits on the scope of vi-
carious liability, and implications of the Briginshaw principle). These 
tensions within the tort can be thought of as reflecting a compromise 
between competing goals. Building a picture of the misfeasance tort 
as a reflection of accountability rationales can assist in explaining 
some of these anomalous aspects of the tort. 
This characterisation of the tort might also help to explain why it 
continues to remain a focal point in discussions of government liability, 
notwithstanding its low rates of success in practice. Government ac-
countability need not always be measured by reference to outcomes, 
but may instead, in some cases, be reflected in the potential of those 
outcomes. As stated by Mulgan: 
Strictly speaking, the concept of accountability implies potentiality (ac-
count-ability), the possibility of being called and held to account. Some-
one can therefore be accountable without actually being called to ac-
count. All that is necessary is that some account-holder has a right to 
call the agent to account, not that this right is actually exercised.214 
On this view, the very existence of the misfeasance tort may be 
viewed as a critical contribution to government accountability, irre-
spective of how often a claim is successful in practice. What is im-
portant is the fact that wronged individuals have a mechanism to al-
lege abuse of power by public officers, and in those rare cases where 
the claim is made out, there is potential to achieve restoration, con-
demnation, and deterrence. As explored in this article, the misfea-
sance tort reflects a balance struck between these competing ac-
countability rationales. 
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